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Chair’s preface to the E-Proceedings of the Workshop: 'Reconsidering the Divide between 
Analytic and Continental Philosophy' 
Contemporary philosophy has been haunted by the image of a ‘gulf’ dividing on the one hand so-called 
‘analytic’, and on the other so-called ‘continental’ approaches to the subject. By way of an introduction to 
this idea of a divide, one might briefly mention some highlights from the kinds of polemical, if not in 
some cases abusive, remarks various prominent representatives of one camp direct against others 
commonly associated with the opposition.  
Rudolf Carnap compared metaphysicians like Martin Heidegger to failed musicians or bad poets, 
producing nonsense by attempting to express their attitudes towards life in terms of theory.1 A. J. Ayer 
later rehashed this accusation, comparing Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre to the king in Alice in 
wonderland, who in response to Alice’s remark that she sees nobody on the road, proclaims ‘I only wish 
that I had such eyes, to be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!’.2 Heidegger, in turn, in the midst 
of his flirtation with Nazism, accused Carnap and the Vienna Circle of being in league with both Soviet 
communism and American capitalism.3 Gilbert Ryle’s self-proclaimed sympathetic review of 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit ends by claiming that phenomenology is doomed to a disastrous mysticism.4 
His review closes by noting that ‘Sein und Zeit, it is worth mentioning, is most beautifully printed and the 
pages have generous margins’.5 Ryle would later proclaim that continental philosophy did not progress 
because it did not benefit from the British development of modern logic.6 R. M. Hare preferred an 
institutional explanation: German and French philosophy had suffered from the absence of the Oxford 
tutorial system.7 And later on, Jacques Derrida would refuse to use John Searle’s name in replying to him, 
preferring to refer to him as Sarl (the French for limited liability company),8 while Searle followed 
Foucault in referring to Derrida as an ‘obscurantiste terroriste’.9
Yet, despite the picture of an unsurpassable divide that these exchanges have served to conjure,
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In recent years, there has been a growing number of attempts to overcome, revise, deflate, or re-
conceptualise the very notion of a divide, which has been seen by the majority of its commentators as 
becoming heretofore untenable. The time seems to be ripe, then, for reconsidering the entrenched 
assumptions about the particular view of twentieth century philosophy as divided into two camps. 
 there 
are reasons to be suspicious of the idea that there is a supposed divide between two (and only two) 
philosophical traditions. Clearly, philosophers from the continent have been influential in the history of 
analytic philosophy, and ‘continental’ philosophy has more or less throughout the twentieth century been 
in some manner present in the Anglo-Saxon world (e.g. in British Idealism, American Pragmatism). 
The papers that follow reconsider particular aspects of the divide in question. In their article on 
Brentano’s Polish legacy, Piotr Leśniewski and Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska survey the ways in which 
the development of twentieth century philosophy in Poland has been based on effortless crossings of the 
divide. Susan Gottlöber’s article compares between Nagel and Moore’s contributions to ethical theory on 
the one hand, and Scheler’s personalism on the other, showing how the latter might provide answers to 
some of the problems posed by the former. Finally, Søren Gosvig Olesen, drawing from his personal 
experience in teaching ‘continental philosophy’ on the continent, asks what, if any, criteria may allow one 
to think of ‘continental philosophy’ as a unified phenomenon.11
Many thanks are due to all the workshop’s contributors, as well as to Christopher Norris, Shaun 
Gallagher, Christos Hadjioannou, Frank Chouraqui, and last but not least Marianna Papastephanou. 
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